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The Evidentiary Use of Tachograph
Charts in Civil Litigation
I. Introduction
The tachograph is a precision recording tachometer2 widely
used on trains, trucks and buses.3 Essentially, the device is a combi-
nation clock, speedometer, odometer and recording machine.4 The
instrument is connected to a vehicle's speedometer cable and then to
a recording device that is synchronized with time." The recorder con-
tinually charts the movement of the vehicle, beginning with its time
of departure and ending with its time of arrival at the vehicle's desti-
nation. The recording is made on a round, wax-coated paper disc
with inscribing styli that produces a record of speed, engine use and
miles traveled.6
The widespread use of tachographs throughout the transporta-
tion industry is attributed to the desire to monitor driver perform-
ance and productivity. The charts enable corporate managers to as-
certain if their drivers are in compliance with company standards
relating to speed, stops, established routes, and times of arrival. They
also provide an economical and efficient means of verifying informa-
tion contained in the driver's trip sheets." While the primary purpose
of the charts is to aid companies in determining whether their fleets
are being operated in a cost efficient manner, a corollary use for the
charts has developed in a legal context.
Tachograph charts are recognized as a valuable evidentiary tool
because they provide litigants with a method of proving the speed at
which a vehicle wa.s traveling. Tachograph discs have been admitted
in prosecutions for vehicular violations to rebut evidence of speeding
I. A tachograph attaches to the speedometer cable of a vehicle and records speed, brak-
ing, idling, mileage and virtually everything a vehicle does from the time the device is turned
on at the beginning of a driver's shift until it is turned off at the end of that shift. The tacho-
graph reduces all this information to a five-inch circular disc that can be reviewed and ana-
lyzed. The term "tachograph" is often used interchangeably with the terms: "tactograph,"
"tachogram," "tachometer," and "recording speedometer."
2. Conrad, The Tachograph as Evidence of Speed, 8 WAYNE L. REV. 287, 288 (1962).
3. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 210 at 516 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK].
4. State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 574, 115 A.2d 35, 37 (1955).
5. Conrad, supra note 2, at 288.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 36 Cal. App. 3d 262, 111 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1974) (truck
driver's embezzlement of petroleum was detected through comparison of tachograph records
with the driver's trip sheets).
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detected by radar enforcement mechanisms.' Administratively, the
readings have been proffered by employers in response to wrongful
discharge claims to provide justification for an employee's dismissal.
In this context, the charts are submitted to prove that the employee
engaged in conduct contrary to company policy by making unautho-
rized stops,9 exceeding the speed limit,"0 or tampering with the de-
vice to conceal incriminating evidence."
Although tachograph charts have been admitted in both crimi-
nal and administrative proceedings, the primary focus of this Com-
ment is on their use in civil litigation. In civil suits, the courts have
permitted the introduction of tachograph recordings to contradict or
corroborate other relevant testimony. 2 Despite the damaging infor-
mation that can be revealed, the admissibility of the charts has sel-
dom been questioned on appeal."3 In those instances in which the
evidence has been challenged, the primary objection raised has re-
lated to the proponent's failure to lay a proper foundation prior to
admission.' 4 Authorities responding to this objection have adopted a
somewhat vague standard, admitting the charts if "properly identi-
fied and authenticated."'"
Initially, such an approach requires compliance with the basic
evidentiary prerequisites set forth in Frye v. United States. 6 Frye,
the seminal case addressing the introduction of scientific evidence,
8. See. e.g., People v. Barbic, 105 Ill. App. 2d 360, 244 N.E.2d 626 (1969); State v.
Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955); People v. Williams, 196 N.Y.S.2d 790, 23 Misc.
2d 581 (1960).
9. See Brocker Manuf. & Supply Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 94 Pa.
Commw. 628, 504 A.2d 413 (1986) (employer submitted tachograph evidence which revealed
that claimant's truck used an unusually excessive amount of fuel and inferred that driver was
making unauthorized stops).
10. See Bourn v. Dept. of Employment Security, 134 Vt. 490, 365 A.2d 253 (1976)
(employer introduced tachograph charts in an attempt to prove that driver had been dis-
charged for exceeding the speed limit in violation of company policy).
II. See Barnum v. Williams, 84 Nev. 37, 436 P.2d 219 (1968) (employer refused
driver's claim for benefits alleging that employee had engaged in misconduct by removing and
destroying tachograph chart following accident).
12. Conrad, supra note 2, at 297. See also infra notes 32-81 and accompanying text.
13. See Villegas v. Bryson, 16 Ariz. App. 456, -, 494 P.2d 61, 62 (1972)
("Tachographs and related testimony have been introduced and found informative in various
lawsuits, but the admissibility of such a tachograph has seldom been questioned on appeal.").
14. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
15. This standard is vague because the cases have failed to address what is required to
"properly identify" the charts. Authorities subscribing to this approach, however, agree that
authentication includes a showing that the specific device which produced the charts was in
good working order and accurate at the time the charts were made. See, e.g., Villegas, 16
Ariz. App. at __ , 494 P.2d at 62; Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Schruefer, 34 Md. App.
706, 716, 369 A.2d 118, 124 (1977); see also Conrad, supra note 2, at 297; MCCORMICK,
supra note 3, at 515.
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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mandates that the proponent demonstrate that the theory and instru-
ment have "gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which they belong." ' 17 The Frye test is most frequently cited as the
standard for determining the admissibility of a novel scientific tech-
nique through expert testimony." The primary purpose for requiring
compliance with the Frye test is to establish that the results have
been produced by a device which is generally recognized as trustwor-
thy and reliable (i.e., that it can be depended upon to reflect the
truth). 19
The requirements set forth in Frye provide some guidance to the
courts in making the initial admissibility determination, but leave
unresolved the question as to whether the accuracy ' of a particular
device is an essential element of proof or merely a matter going to
the weight of the evidence.2 0 To establish the accuracy of a scientific
instrumentality, the proponent must demonstrate that the device was
in good working order at the time the test was made or the results
were recorded. 2
When dealing with tachograph evidence, establishing accuracy
presents a peculiar problem, primarily because the tachograph is not
17. "Frye v. United States, the loadstone guiding the forensic scientist, teaches us that
the reliability of scientific tests and results must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the field in which they belong." Conrad, supra note 2, at 292. In Frye,
the court noted:
Just when a scientific principle crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in the twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
to which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
18. Recently the Frye test has been the subject of considerable criticism. Critics claim
that: I ) it is selectively applied by the courts to some scientific techniques but not to others; 2)
it offers a vague standard that is not easily applied; and 3) its conservative nature deprives the
courts of reliable evidence. For a detailed discussion addressing these criticisms and noting a
trend toward judicial reassessment of the standards for admitting scientific proof, see SCIEN-
TIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 11-32 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed. 1981).
19. E. FISHER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPEED MEASUREMENT DEVICES 19 (1976).
20. The Frye test deals only with the necessity for expert testimony to prove the validity
of the underlying theory and the reliability of the instrument. With regard to scientific evi-
dence, courts are split on the issue of whether accuracy of the particular instrument is a mat-
ter of foundation or weight.
In some jurisdictions, proof of the working order of the instrument is not an
essential element of the foundation. In these jurisdictions, the failure to prove
operating order goes only to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
However, the predominant view in the United States is that the proponent must
show that the particular instrument used in the test was in good operating order
at the time of the test.
SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 18, at 52.
21. S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 15:16 at 46 (1972).
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a piece of original equipment incorporated into the truck at the time
of manufacture.22 It is installed separately and is internally cali-
brated by the company that manufactures it.2 3 Once installed, accu-
rate operation depends on the receipt of proper input from the
truck's rotor cable. If the cable fails to revolve at the proper rate,2
the device will record inaccurately. 25 Accuracy checks can be made
by attaching a calibration device to the speedometer cable, which
"counts" the revolutions per mile.20 Unfortunately, competent accu-
racy checks are not mandated, but are left solely to the discretion of
the company utilizing the device. In the absence of documentary evi-
dence, such as maintenance checklists or calibration records, proof of
accuracy of the particular instrument presents a difficult burden to
be overcome by the proponent.
The predominant view among those jurisdictions directly ad-
dressing the foundational prerequisites necessary for the introduction
of tachograph records has been that the accuracy of the particular
tachograph must be proven prior to its admission into evidence .2 In
other jurisdictions, however, proof of operating order is not an essen-
tial element of the foundation, but instead goes only to the weight of
the evidence and not the admissibility of the results.28
Thus, the main point of controversy surrounding the use of
tachograph evidence is the establishment of its accuracy. Critical
questions include whether the use of a tachograph carries with it a
presumption of accuracy; which party has the burden of proof; and
alternatively, how is accuracy to be established or impeached.2 9 The
lack of decisiveness in these areas has made the evidentiary use of
the charts a prime issue for review and analysis. It is the purpose of
this Comment to analyze the use of tachograph evidence by discuss-
ing the various approaches to admissibility that have been advocated
in the past 30 as well as by providing a detailed proposal showing how
such evidence should be used in future litigation.3 '
22. Adkins v. Dirickson, 523 F. Supp. 1281, 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
23. Id. at 1287.
24. If the test reveals 1000 revolutions per mile, the tachograph is considered to be
100% accurate. Id.
25. Id.
26. Villegas, 16 Ariz. App. at -, 494 P.2d at 63.
27. See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 32-81 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 89-137 and accompanying text.
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II. Case Analysis
One of the earliest reported cases questioning the introduction
of tachograph evidence was Cooper v. Hoeglund.3 2 Cooper involved
a wrongful death action in which the plaintiff's decedent was struck
by a truck that had swerved into his lane. At trial, the defendant
introduced a tachograph record taken from the decedent's vehicle to
reinforce his claim that the victim was contributorily negligent by
traveling in excess of the speed limit.
33
To rebut this evidence, the plaintiff was permitted to introduce
testimony explaining the basic operation of the device."' Addition-
ally, the plaintiff attempted to show that the markings made on the
chart were not recorded by the instrument, but were caused when
the policeman removed the disc. 5 Following a verdict for the plain-
tiff, the defendant appealed claiming that the trial court erred in
allowing the plaintiff to rebut the tachograph testimony.3 6 On ap-
peal, the court held that no error had occurred because an explana-
tion of the operation and accuracy of the speed device, or lack of
such accuracy, was a proper subject of inquiry.
3 7
In Cooper, the trial court admitted the tachograph record into
evidence without requiring the defendant to establish the device's
mechanics, its overall dependability, or its accuracy. The plaintiff did
not challenge the initial admission of the evidence, but argued that
the chart was inaccurate due to improper handling.38 The trial court
accepted the evidence in total derogation of the standards previously
set forth in Frye v. United States.3 9 Frye requires that the proponent
of evidence deduced from a novel scientific technique establish the
validity of the underlying theory of the instrument as well as its gen-
32. 221 Minn. 446, 22 N.W.2d 450 (1946).
33. Id. at 452, 22 N.W.2d at 454. The disc had been forcibly removed from the dece-
dent's truck by a highway patrolman following the accident. The police officer testified that the
markings on the chart revealed that the decedent had been traveling at a speed of 58 miles per
hour at the time of impact. The appellate court did not address how these charts were intro-





37. "Explanation of the operation and accuracy of a speed and other recording devices is
a proper subject of inquiry." Id.
38. By not objecting to the introduction of the tachograph evidence, the plaintiff failed
to preserve the question of the propriety of its admission for appeal. The appellate court, there-
fore, could not address whether foundation testimony was necessary. Id.
39. The court's complete silence with respect to the Frye standards is particularly sur-
prising given the novelty of the tachograph in 1946. This approach would weigh heavily in
favor of requiring expert testimony to establish the validity of the underlying theory upon
which the instrument is based, as well as a showing of general reliability.
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eral reliability.'
While the Cooper decision illustrates a substantial departure
from the foundational prerequisites set forth in Frye, the language
contained in the opinion implies that the court did not consider the
evidence sufficiently scientific to require invocation of the Frye prin-
ciples."1 The court's opinion indicates that accuracy was merely a
matter of impeachment that would go to the weight of the evidence,
rather than to an element of foundation.' 2 This interpretation is sup-
ported by the fact that there was no testimony by an acknowledged
expert that the tachograph could be considered a reliable determi-
nant of speed. The court also held that the establishment of the
chart's inaccuracy was a proper subject of inquiry by the opposing
party."3
Another early case adopting an approach substantially similar
to that taken in Cooper, is Whitton v. Central Georgia Railway
Company."" In Whitton, the plaintiff sued a railroad company for
damages sustained when his car collided with a train at a grade
crossing.'3 Following the entry of a verdict for the defendant, the
plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in admitting a
tachograph recording which was interpreted as illustrating that the
speed of the train had decreased uniformly before coming to a com-
plete stop at the crossing.46 The plaintiff objected to this evidence on
the ground that the witness failed to lay a proper foundation because
he did not state how the device operated. The plaintiff further ar-
gued that expert testimony was required to demonstrate how the
tape was made.' The appellate court rejected this contention, find-
ing that the witness' failure to explain the mechanical principles of
the machine did not preclude its admissibility. The court reasoned
that since the plaintiff failed to cross-examine the witness as to how
the machine operated or how the tape was made, he must have been
satisfied with the testimony in these respects. Therefore, the lower
40. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 37. In its opinion, the court did not make an inquiry into the scien-
tific nature of the tachograph as an instrumentality of proof. The lack of discussion on this
issue implies that the tachograph was not viewed as a scientific device subject to the estab-
lished standards governing the admissibility of such evidence.
42. Holding that an explanation of the operation and possible inaccuracy of the device
was a proper subject of inquiry by the opposing party, the court sanctioned an approach that
permitted introduction of the charts in the absence of foundation testimony, thereby leaving
their weight to be assessed by the fact-finder.
43. Cooper at 452, 22 N.W.2d at 454.
44. 89 Ga. App. 304, 79 S.E.2d 331 (1953).
45. Id. at 305, 79 S.E.2d at 332.
46. Id. at 306, 79 S.E.2d at 333.
47. Id.
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court did not err in admitting the speed recorder tape over the plain-
tiff's objections. 8
In both Cooper and Whitton there was a total absence of testi-
mony concerning the reliability of the tachograph as an instrumen-
tality of proof, and a complete lack of proof regarding the accuracy
of the particular tachograph that produced the charts. The opinions
are significant because each court recognized that the tachograph is
capable of providing competent evidence of speed. As a result of
each proponent's failure to establish the tachograph's scientific au-
thenticity and reliability, however, these cases cannot be considered
too favorably. Several later cases which demonstrate a much stricter
adherence to the principles governing the introduction of scientific
evidence are extremely beneficial in providing guidance to those
courts that have not yet addressed the evidentiary use of tachograph
charts.
One of these later cases, Bell v. Kroger,49 involved an action
brought by the widow of an individual who died in a head-on colli-
sion with a tractor-trailer owned by the defendant. In Bell, the plain-
tiff appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging that the court
erred in allowing the defendant to introduce the tachograph charts
of its driver.50 The court reversed, noting that the novelty of the
tachograph required expert testimony in order to sufficiently prove
the accuracy of the particular device producing the records. 1 The
defense failed to meet this burden because the testimony of its wit-
nesses merely explained the general operation of the device and only
established that the charts were usually found to be accurate. 2
48. The court specifically stated:
Watson's testimony was in explanation of the tape and the fact that he did
not know how the recording machine operated was no ground of objection to
such evidence. Joe M. White had previously testified as to the method of the
machine's operation, and stated that the speed of the engine could be determined
at any particular point from the record made. He was not cross-examined as to
how the machine operated or how it made the tape; therefore, the plaintiff must
have been satisfied with his testimony in these respects. The court did not err in
admitting the speed recorder tape over the objection made thereto.
Id. at 306-7, 79 S.E.2d at 333. For another interesting case illustrating the ad hoc basis upon
which early decisions were made regarding the introduction of tachograph evidence, see Gulf,
Colorado & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Parmer, 389 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (the court
held that the tachograph tape was admissible, however, it could not be accepted as providing
conclusive evidence of speed).
49. 230 Ark. 384, 323 S.W.2d 424 (1959). The cause of action in Bell was brought by
the widow of an individual who was killed in a head-on collision with a tractor-trailer owned
by the defendant. At trial, the plaintiff and her child received a "take-nothing" judgment. Id.
50. Id. at 387, 323 S.W.2d 426.
51. Id.
52. Id. (the court noted that a finding of the device's inaccuracy was strongly indicated
by the record; a witness stated that the tachograph in question had not been checked for
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While this testimony could be construed as comporting with the
criteria set forth in Frye,"3 the court enunciated an additional foun-
dational element which required the proponent to establish that the
tachograph was in good working order at the time the chart was
produced.5 This determination marked a substantial departure from
the approach taken in Cooper and Whitton, because it advocated the
total preclusion of tachograph evidence in the absence of an initial
showing of accuracy. 55
Although Bell set forth a new prerequisite to admissibility, it
did not address what specific method was required to authenticate
tachograph evidence. An attempt to enunciate positive criteria came
to fruition in the case of Villegas v. Bryson.56 In determining
whether the trial court had erred in admitting tachograph evidence
from the defendant's truck, the appellate court in Villegas held that
a tachograph recording of a vehicle's speed is admissible if properly
identified and duly authenticated.57 Authentication was deemed to
include proof that the particular instrument relied upon was in good
working order and accurate at the time the recording was made.58
In Villegas, the court found that the defendant had produced
sufficient evidence to establish accuracy.59 This evidence consisted of
testimony from the defendant's shop foreman who had run a check
on the truck's speedometer system following the accident. The accu-
racy check was accomplished by attaching a counter to the speedom-
eter cable which registered 987 revolutions per mile out of a possible
defects at any point after its installation in 1948).
53. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
54. Bell, 230 Ark. at 387, 323 S.W.2d at 426. See also Texas & New York Orleans
R.R. Co. v. Lemke, 365 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1963). In Lemke, the court stated that a proponent
of tachograph tape has the preliminary burden of proving the tape's accuracy. The proponent
failed to fulfill this burden due to the lack of testimony showing that the points of acceleration
and deceleration recorded on the chart could be adequately correlated with specific locations
on the ground.
55. The approach adopted by the majority opinion in Bell has not escaped criticism.
Justices Holt and McFadden dissented on the ground that under Whitton v. Central of Geor-
gia Ry. Co., 89 Ga. App. 304, 79 S.E.2d 331 (1953), the trial court correctly submitted the
evidence to the jury with the following instruction:
I will admit it. The weight-the jury will understand that this is a mechani-
cal device. It will be admitted for whatever light it may shed-that is a question
for the jury. The court holds that it is admissible. The weight, if any, to be
afforded is a question for the jury. Such weight as you see proper or reject as
you see proper.
Bell, 230 Ark. at 390, 323 S.W.2d at 428.
56. 16 Ariz. App. 456, 494 P.2d 61 (1972).
57. Id. at __ , 494 P.2d at 62.
58. The court stated "law and common sense require that the accuracy of the particular




1000, thus making the device 98.7% accurate. 0 Additionally, the de-
fendant produced the regional manager for the tachograph manufac-
turing corporation. The manager explained the operation of the de-
vice and stated that the accuracy of the odometer could be
adequately determined by tallying the number of revolutions per
minute per mile.6 ' The testimony of these two witnesses was held to
meet the proponent's burden of establishing accuracy of the specific
device.6"
The Villegas case was subsequently cited with approval in Great
Coastal Express, Inc. v. Schruefer.63 In this case, the lower court
had permitted the defendant to introduce tachograph records based
on its conclusion that the tape might be admissible under the ordi-
nary business records exception to the hearsay rule."' Citing Ville-
gas, the appellate court rejected the trial court's conclusion and held
that the tachograph evidence should not have been admitted because
there was no showing that the machine had been calibrated either
prior to or following the collision.65
While Villegas and Great Coastal set forth the general require-
ments for admissibility in more concrete terms than had been stated
in the past, their holdings were not supported by historical prece-
dent. On the contrary, until Villegas, most courts had merely ac-
cepted the evidence without any discussion of either the scientific
nature of the tachograph or its foundational prerequisites."6 In these
cases, the "experts" presenting tachograph testimony consisted of
60. Id.
61. The expert testified as follows:
By the system check, the ratio check of 987 would establish the accuracy of
the odometer and on mileage recording stylus and by taking a previous period of
time checking the miles traveled against the time factor and comparing it with
the speed registering stylus we are able to prove the accuracy of the chart.
Id.
62. Id.
63. 34 Md. App. 706, 369 A.2d 118 (1977).
64. Id. at 714, 369 A.2d at 124. For a discussion of the use of the ordinary business
record exception in relation to the justification for the admissibility of tachograph evidence, see
infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
65. Schruefer at 716, 369 A.2d at 125.
66. See, e.g., Edwards v. Mayes, 385 F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1967); Grooms v. Minute-
Maid, 267 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1959); Warren v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 183 Cal.
App. 2d 155, 6 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1960); Smith v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 125 Ga. App.
273, 187 S.E.2d 299 (1972); Kenney v. Churchill Truck Lines, 6 III. App. 3d 983, 286 N.E.2d
619 (1972); Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md. 676, 217 A.2d 525 (1966); Safeway Trails, Inc.
v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 159 A.2d 823 (1960); Heiserman v. Baltimore & Annapolis R.R., 15
Md. App. 657, 292 A.2d 140 (1972); Johnson v. New York Central R.R., 357 Mich. 40, 97
N.W.2d 769 (1959); Hodges v. American Bakeries Co., 412 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. 1967); Dixon v.
Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., 321 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1959); Benner v. Weaver, 394 Pa.
503, 147 A.2d 388 (1959); Tennessee Trailways Inc. v. Ervin, 222 Tenn. 523, 438 S.W.2d 733
(1969); Sanchez v. Billings, 481 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
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truck drivers,67 engineers, 68 and state policemen.6 9 Additionally, the
testimony proffered by these witnesses was as varied as the individu-
als presenting it. Testimony ranged from mere interpretation of the
charts as to the recorded speed at the time of impact,"0 to thorough
explanations of the operation of the device.7 1 From these earlier ap-
pellate cases, it is virtually impossible to ascertain what standards
governed the courts' initial determination of the admissibility of the
charts.
Adding to this pre-Villegas confusion was Hall v. Dexter Gas
Co. 71 In Hall, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's introduction
of a tachograph recording on the ground that it had not been prop-
erly authenticated by the testimony of the vice president of the de-
fendant company. The court, however, found that the chart was ad-
missible under the ordinary business record exception to the hearsay
rule.73 The rationale for admitting the recording under this rule was
based on the chart's probability of trustworthiness, which arose from
the trucking company's continual reliance on them for monitoring
driver activity. 74 This case added to the initial confusion because ap-
67. See, e.g., Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md. 676, 217 A.2d 525 (1966); Hodges v.
American Bakeries, 412 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. 1967); Dixon v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc.,
321 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1959).
68. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Billings, 481 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Gulf, Colo-
rado & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Parmer, 389 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
69. See, e.g., Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 159 A.2d 823 (1960).
70. See. e.g., Weishaar v. Conestrale, 241 Md. 676, 217 A.2d 525 (1966); Hodges v.
American Bakeries, 412 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. 1967); Dixon v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc.,
321 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1959).
71. See, e.g., Heiserman v. Baltimore & Annapolis R.R. Co., 15 Md. App. 657, 292
A.2d 140 (1972); Sanchez v. Billings, 481 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
72. 277 Ala. 360, 170 So.2d 796 (1965).
73. Section 12-21-43 of the Code of Alabama, pertaining to the admissibility of business
records, states:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or other-
wise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or
event, shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction or event if
it was made in the regular course of any business and it was the regular course
of the business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act,
transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. All
other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of
personal knowledge by the entrant or maker may be shown to affect its weight,
but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term 'business' shall include a
business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind.
ALA. CODE § 12-21-43 (1975).
74. FED. R. EviD. 803(6) currently embodies the business record exception to the hear-
say rule. It provides:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information certain what standards governed the courts' initial determination of
the admissibility of the charts.
Adding to this regular practice of that business activity to make the memo-
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plication of the business record exception provided additional support
for the introduction of the charts in the absence of foundation testi-
mony, and left merely their weight to be assessed by the fact-
finder. 5
Given these decisions, the need for a delineated standard was
obvious. The Villegas decision was an attempt to clarify evidentiary
questions that previously had been ignored by the majority of courts.
Although the case enunciated a standard scientific test which pro-
vided that the tape had to be properly identified and duly authenti-
cated prior to its admission into evidence, its success in adopting
workable criteria is questionable. The court merely reiterated the
general principles of proof without adapting them to the specific in-
strumentality. It failed to provide any guidance for the proponent
who must establish the accuracy of a particular machine. Once
again, the courts were left to make admissibility determinations on
an ad hoc basis. This is best illustrated by some of the post-Villegas
cases in which the courts admitted tachograph evidence without pro-
viding the slightest indication whether it was established that the
machine was accurate at the time the recording was made. 76
randum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The
term 'business' as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, associa-
tion, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted
for profit,
The primary rationale for this exception rests on the principle of trustworthiness. Thus,
the rule expressly authorizes the courts to exclude business records when the source of infor-
mation or the means of preparation indicates a lack of trustworthiness. This rule should not be
construed to allow the automatic introduction of tachograph charts upon a mere showing that
the company relied on the discs in the ordinary course of business. In the absence of founda-
tion testimony which establishes that the tachograph has been previously checked for accuracy,
the records do not have the requisite degree of trustworthiness necessary for introduction. Un-
like accounting data or hospital records, the tachograph charts are not only subject to human
error, but are also susceptible to error resulting from mechanical failure. This factor weighs in
favor of requiring that a proper foundation be laid prior to the chart's admission into evidence.
See, e.g., Horner v. Commonwealth Unemployment Board of Review, - Pa. Commw. -,
-, 522 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1987) (court refused to permit use of the business records excep-
tion to justify introduction of tachograph charts into evidence at unemployment compensation
proceeding based on a finding that the exception "does not make competent such matters con-
tained in the records that are otherwise violative of evidentiary rules").
75. For another early case permitting introduction of tachograph charts under the ordi-
nary business record exception, see NLRB v. Pacific Intermountain Express, 228 F.2d 170
(8th Cir. 1956). In Pacific Intermountain, the court stated:
Some question is raised as to the admissibility of the tachograph charts in
evidence. The tachographs were installed and maintained by the Company. The
drivers were required to turn in the tachograph charts. Under such circum-
stances the charts were admissible as business records . . . . The weight to be
given the charts was for determination of the fact finding body.
Id. at 172 (citations omitted).
76. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Springfield, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1114, 432 N.E.2d 617 (1982)
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The Villegas decision inevitably became the subject of consider-
able controversy. In Adkins v. Dirickson,77 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected all prior decisions sug-
gesting that the proponent of tachograph evidence must lay a foun-
dation by showing the accuracy of the particular tachograph.78
Based on a fairly extensive analysis of case law from other jurisdic-
tions,79 the court held that the tachograph was insufficiently scien-
tific to require that a foundation be laid prior to admission. 80 This
holding was attributed in part to a finding that the tachograph could
be classified as a relatively simple, unsophisticated device that oper-
ated on the same mechanical principles as a speedometer, therefore
enabling the jury to easily comprehend impeachment testimony con-
cerning its accuracy.81
Despite conflicting authorities, the cases outlined above demon-
strate a discernible trend that requires a proper foundation to be laid
prior to the introduction of tachograph evidence. 8 Under a strict sci-
entific evidence view, the proponent must show that the tachograph
employs a scientifically reliable procedure which is generally ac-
(three experts read the tachograph chart and each established a different speed at the point of
impact); Western Packing Co. v. Visser, II Wash. App. 149, 521 P.2d 939 (1974) (readings of
tachograph in plaintiff's truck, interpreted by different witnesses, placed speed at the point of
impact both below and in excess of the speed limit).
77. 523 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
78. Id. at 1284.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1287, n.9.
81.
[A] tachograph operates on simple, understandable principles removed from
the frontiers of science; the range of accuracy of the key portion-the speedome-
ter-is within the experience of most jurors; there is great experience in its man-
ufacture, operation and use as evidence; and by its nature, it does not require
frequent adjustment. I therefore hold that, in this case, accuracy of the particu-
lar tachograph was a matter of impeachment going to the weight of the evidence
rather than a matter of foundation.
Id. at 1287 (citations omitted). But see, Horner v. Commonwealth Unemployment Board of
Review, - Pa. Commw. -, 522 A.2d 1197 (1987) where the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court declined to follow the rationale set forth by the court in Adkins.
We agree with the majority of courts that accuracy is a necessary element
in laying a foundation for the admissibility of tachographic evidence.
Tachographs, and particularly the accuracy of their clocks, are not so within the
common knowledge of the layman so as to dispense with the need for expert
testimony . . . .We find the reasoning of Adkins unpersuasive and decline to
adopt it. Thus, we hold that accuracy is a necessary element in laying a founda-
tion for the admissibility of tachographic evidence.
Id. at -, 522 A.2d at 1200.
82. See, e.g., Villegas v. Bryson, 16 Ariz. App. 456, 458, 494 P.2d 61, 63 (1972); Bell v.
Kroger, 230 Ark. 384, 386-87, 323 S.W.2d 424, 426 (1959); Thompson v. Chicago Eastern
Illinois, 32 II. App. 2d 397, 405, 178 N.E.2d 151, 155 (1961); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v.
Schruefer, 34 Md. App. 706, 714-16, 369 A.2d 118, 124 (1977).
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cepted in the particular field.83 Additionally, there must be proof
that the particular instrument relied upon was in good working order
and accurate at the time the recording was made.8
While this approach illustrates the predominant view among
those jurisdictions directly addressing the subject, most courts have
failed to provide any detailed rationale for their holdings. 8 Not only
do these opinions lack clear explanations, but they also lack any in-
formation outlining the type of testimony required to properly iden-
tify and authenticate the device.
Another factor contributing to the difficulty is that the case law
has diverged with regard to evidence of accuracy at the time the
speed measurement was made. The decisions range from holdings
that in the absence of tests on the specific tachograph, the results are
not admissible,86 to holdings that lack of testing goes only to the
weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility of the results. 87
The absence of clarification in this area is indicative of the need for
clearly enunciated standards addressing the foundational prerequi-
sites to be followed in admitting tachograph evidence, as well as the
method of establishing such elements.
III. An Approach to Admissibility
Before setting forth criteria that may resolve the problems asso-
ciated with the evidentiary use of tachograph charts, it is necessary
to recognize that the device is in fact a scientific instrument. Al-
though no court has expressly categorized the device as a scientific
instrumentality of proof, this classification can be inferred from
those decisions requiring that a foundation be laid prior to its intro-
duction.88 If tachograph charts were not considered scientific evi-
83. Conrad, supra note 2, at 297.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Villegas, 16 Ariz. App. at 458, 494 P.2d at 63 ("the law and common
sense require"); Bell, 230 Ark. at 387, 323 S.W.2d at 426 ("because we are here dealing with
a novel concept of evidence"); Great Coastal Express, 34 Md. App. at 716, 369 A.2d at 124
(no reason given but quoted trial judge who relied entirely on precedent from other jurisdic-
tions); see also Conrad, supra note 2, at 296 (unless showing of accuracy required, "scientific
proof of this nature becomes meaningless"); MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 516 (relates major-
ity rule and does not take independent view).
86. See, e.g., Bell, 230 Ark. at 387, 323 S.W.2d at 426 (Tachograph had been placed on
bus in 1948 and accident occurred in 1951. Testimony revealed that instrument had not been
checked since installation and court found this indicative of inaccuracy.); Great Coastal, 34
Md. App. at 716, 369 A.2d at 124 (At the time of the accident, the truck had an odometer
reading of 265,000 miles. A witness testified that he had no knowledge of calibration either
prior to or following accident, thus, the court concluded that lack of such evidence rendered
the tape incapable of belief.).
87. Adkins v. Dirickson, 523 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
88. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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dence, the evidence could be introduced without laying a foundation,
thereby allowing the fact-finder to assess its weight. This result is
best illustrated in Adkins v. Dirickson.s9
The court in Adkins found that the tachograph operated on the
same principles as an ordinary speedometer. Since accuracy of the
disc correlated with that of the tachograph's speedometer, evidence
of speed deduced from an untested tachograph should go to the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.9" This approach
is without merit because it ignores the fact that the tachograph is a
more complex instrument than the ordinary speedometer. In addition
to recording the speed of a vehicle, the tachograph also monitors dis-
tance traveled, engine idling, and starts and stops of the vehicle. This
is all done in synchronization with time."' These factors indicate that
the degree of complexity of the tachograph far exceeds that of the
typical speedometer, and thus renders it more susceptible to mal-
function. The complexity of the device, coupled with the increased
possibility of malfunction, weighs in favor of requiring that a proper
foundation be laid prior to its admission.92
In order to lay this foundation, the proponent should first elicit
89. 523 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
90. Id. at 1286. The main thrust of the court's contention is that the tachograph is
nothing more than an ordinary speedometer. If the tachograph is viewed in this manner, its
results would be admissible in the absence of a foundation. In State v. Tarquinio, 3 Conn. Cir.
566, 221 A.2d 595 (1966), the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court of Connecticut summa-
rized the general acceptance accorded speedometer readings as follows:
The general accuracy of speedometers is a matter of general knowledge
. . . . Speedometers, like other machines may get out of order, but they may be
relied upon with reasonable certainty to determine accurately the speed at which
a vehicle is driven. It cannot be said therefore that, because some speedometers
may be out of order, speed may not be measured by instruments manufactured
for the purpose and usually giving approximately correct speeds . . . . The evi-
dence does not have to be infallible to be admissible. If it is of aid to the judge
or jury, its deficiencies or weaknesses are a matter of defense which affect the
weight of the evidence but do not determine its admissibility.
3 Conn. Cir. at __ , 221 A.2d at 596-97 (1966) (citations omitted).
91. The advertising manual obtained from a regiona office of the tachograph manufac-
turing company states that the tachograph accurately indicates and records data in relation to
the exact time. Further, the company advertises that the instrument provides fleet managers
with an accurate, reliable record of vehicle and driver activity relative to speed, distance trav-
eled, engine operation and idle, and selected extra events important to effective management
programs.
92. To establish a proper foundation for scientific evidence, proof of the following ele-
ments is recommended: I) witness #I (an expert) is qualified to establish the theory's validity
and the instrument's reliability; 2) the underlying theory is valid; 3) the underlying theory is
generally accepted as valid; 4) the instrument is reliable; 5) the instrument is generally ac-
cepted as reliable; 6) witness #2 (a technician) is qualified to conduct and interpret test results;
7) the instrument witness #2 used was in good working condition; 8) the witness used the
instrument in the test; 9) the witness used the proper procedures; and 10) the witness states
the test results. E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 92 (1980).
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testimony that provides a comprehensible description of the tacho-
graph through identification of its basic physical qualities.13 Since
inspection of the instrument by the trier of fact is the best means to
ascertain its nature and qualities,9 ' it may be beneficial for the pro-
ponent to produce the actual tachograph that made the chart, or one
which is a similar make and model.95 In cases where scientific testi-
mony is proffered, the use of demonstrative evidence aids the expert
witness in explaining his findings to the judge or jury, and helps the
jurors visualize the instrument.96 Such evidence has been freely ad-
mitted by the courts subject only to the usual requirements of rele-
vancy.9" Thus, the proponent should take advantage of the opportu-
nity to familiarize the fact-finder with the general nature of the
tachograph through the use of demonstrative evidence.
Following identification of the device, the proponent should es-
tablish that the tachograph employs a scientifically reliable proce-
dure. Proof of the instrument's reliability should consist of evidence
that explains the operation of the device, the mechanical principles
that it employs and the purpose for which it is utilized. 8 Testimony
should disclose that the tachograph is generally regarded as capable
of providing competent evidence of speed through the coordination
and integration of relatively simple component parts including a ta-
chometer, odometer, speedometer, clock and recording device. Thii
testimony would sufficiently demonstrate that the tachograph pro-
duces reliable results accepted by those companies utilizing the
device.99
93. SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 18, at 48.
94. S. GARD, supra note 21, § 15:3, at 6.
95. Articles or objects that relate to, or tend to elucidate or explain issues, or form a
part of the transaction involved in the action are admissible in evidence when duly identified
and shown to be in substantially the same condition as at the time of the occurrence. Liberty
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696 (1957).
96. SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 18, at 48.
97. S. GARD, supra note 21, § 15:3, at 6.
98. For an excellent example of the type of testimony that would suffice for these pur-
poses, see People v. Barbic, 105 III. App. 2d 360, 244 N.E.2d 626 (1969). In Barbic, the expert
witness stated that the tachograph is a precision recording speedometer which employs the use
of a mechanical clock that drives a pressure sensitive chart. As the clock drives the chart, it is
marked on three styluses that cut the plastic off the chart. Stylus number one records the
speed of the vehicle; stylus number two records the total miles traveled; and stylus number
three records whether the vehicle is stopped or moving and whether it is stopped with the
engine running or turned off. All of these recordings are made in the correct correlation of the
exact time so that a complete graphic record is made of the vehicle's operation during any
given period of time. The expert also stated that the speedometer cable activated the tacho-
graph; that there were 1000 turns of the speedometer cable per mile; and that there is a geared
connection from the end of the speedometer cable to the tachograph that may come off the
transmission or the front wheel. Id. at 369, 244 N.E.2d at 626.
99. While Frye required that the reliability of scientific tests and results be sufficiently
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Obviously, to comport with the standards set forth in Frye,
these factors must be established through expert testimony.100 The
expert should be qualified in the field of tachograph analysis, 11 or at
a minimum, be familiar with reading and interpreting tachograph
charts. 10 2 Requiring that the expert be properly qualified would pro-
hibit the practice of permitting the introduction of tachograph charts
by the driver involved in the accident.103 Clearly, the credibility of
the speed recording is impaired when the driver of the vehicle at-
tempts to absolve himself from liability through the introduction of
charts which he is incapable of interpreting properly. Under the
standard set forth above, it must be demonstrated to the court that
the expert is experienced in analyzing tachograph charts and capable
of reading the results into evidence.
While expert testimony would help establish the dependability
of the recordings, the necessity of having experts continually prove
that the tachograph is a reliable instrument may be eliminated by
the court's taking judicial notice of this fact. Judicial notice provides
an alternative to the presentation of formal evidence by relieving the
parties of the duty to offer evidence on facts that are within the
sphere of knowledge of the court, or are capable of accurate and
ready determination through sources whose accuracy can not be rea-
sonably questioned.10 4 In the area of scientific evidence, when the use
of a particular device reaches a level of general acceptance in the
community, expert testimony is no longer needed to explain the the-
ory and operation of the instrument.' 05
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field, this requirement was
somewhat softened by the California Court of Appeals which held that in this day of speciali-
zation, general acceptance is acceptance by those who would be expected to be familiar with
its use. People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 862, 331 P.2d 251, 254 (1958).
100. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
101. Documented Vehicle Driver Systems, a California based organization that claims
to be the nation's chief exponent of driver professionalism tied to tachograph operations, has
provided a source of experts in the field of tachograph analysis who have qualified as experts in
a number of cases.
102. The courts have accepted expert testimony offered by representatives of Sangamo
Electric, the manufacturer of the tachograph, as well as testimony from qualified engineers.
See, e.g., Villegas v. Bryson, 16 Ariz. App. 456, 494 P.2d 61 (1972); People v. Barbic, 105 Ill.
App. 2d 360, 244 N.E.2d 626 (1969).
103. See, e.g., Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md. 676, 217 A.2d 525 (1966); Hodges v.
American Bakeries, 412 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. 1967); Dixon v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc.,
321 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1959).
104. FED. R. EvID. 201(b) states two widely accepted tests for judicial notice:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in
that it is either I) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or 2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy can not be reasonably questioned.
105. The doctrine of judicial notice has been applied in the area of speed recording
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The current liberal trend toward the discretionary use of judi-
cial notice, 106 coupled with the widespread use of the tachograph and
its increased use in the courtroom, may warrant invocation of the
doctrine to establish that the instrument has achieved a sufficient
degree of acceptance in the scientific community. 107 Indeed, some
authorities have acknowledged that judicial notice is proper.'08 Al-
though its application would dispense with the need for time-con-
suming formal evidence, the proponent should consider that the aver-
age layman may be unaware of the existence of the device and
unfamiliar with the way it operates. If this is the case, it would be
more beneficial for the proponent to present testimony introducing
the fact-finder to the workings of the device. Such evidence would
overcome any suspicions or doubts that the fact-finder may have
with respect to the operation of the tachograph. Additionally, expert
testimony has a greater potential for impressing the jury than the
judge's unadorned instruction that reliability of the device is a judi-
cially noticed fact.'09
Irrespective of whether the court takes judicial notice of the
overall dependability of the tachograph, the proponent will not be
relieved of the burden of proving that the device which made the
particular recording was accurate at the time it was made." 0 This
foundational element is crucial to the admissibility determination. In
a number of cases in which tachograph evidence has been intro-
duced, courts appear to have either ignored or summarily dismissed
the necessity of proving this essential element."' It is this author's
contention that such an approach must be abandoned. In the absence
of a preliminary showing that the instrument relied upon was in
good working order, the tachograph charts must be excluded from
devices to admit radar speedmeter evidence. In early cases, the courts required expert testi-
mony to explain and assert the scientific acceptance of the Doppler-shift principle as well as its
application to the speedmeter. Over time, continual proof of the underlying scientific principles
and the general reliability of the device became unnecessary because the courts became famil-
iar with these facts and took judicial notice of them. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 516.
106. S. GARD, supra note 21, § 2:3, at 32.
107. Judicially noticed facts are binding upon the trier of fact in civil jury cases. Under
FED. R. EvID. 201(g) the trial judge is required to instruct the jury to accept any judicially-
noticed fact as conclusive. For a more in depth discussion of the effect of judicial notice, see, I
D. LOUISELLI & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 60 at 493 (1980).
108. S. GARD, supra note 21, § 15:16, at 46, n.40; see also Adkins v. Dirickson, 523 F.
Supp. 1281, 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
109. SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 18, at 48.
110. "Judicial notice does not extend to the accuracy or efficiency of any given instru-
ment designed to employ the principle. Whether the instrument is accurate itself and is accu-
rately operated must necessarily be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the trier of fact." State
v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 371, 216 A.2d 625, 629 (1966).
111. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
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evidence.
The primary rationale for requiring an initial showing of accu-
racy is to insure the correctness of the results relied upon, and thus,
their relevancy to the proceedings. If the proponent fails to prove
accuracy, the charts are of no probative value" 2 because they do not
establish the inference that they are offered to prove."13 Typically a
proponent seeks to infer through use of the charts that the vehicle
was traveling at a certain speed at the time of impact. In the absence
of a showing of accuracy, such an inference is impermissible.""
Another benefit of requiring a showing of accuracy is to enable
the fact-finder to conclude that the results are dependable. This is
particularly important given the aura of reliability that ordinarily
surrounds the introduction of scientific evidence." 5 Since the average
lay person tends to assume that the evidence is reliable, the introduc-
tion of the charts may create an impact upon the jury that would
preclude effective impeachment of their accuracy.'
16
With these factors in mind, one must then determine how a pro-
ponent can best establish the accuracy of the particular device. The
most obvious method of illustrating the instrument's accuracy is to
present testimony of a technician who has conducted tests designed
to check the tachograph's operating condition. 7 Another method is
to introduce documents such as maintenance checklists or calibration
records." 8 The production of this evidence is extremely important
112. Conrad, supra note 2, at 293.
113. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 185, at 436.
114. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 185, at 437.
115.
Scientific evidence impresses lay jurors. They tend to assume it is more ac-
curate and objective than lay testimony. A juror who thinks of scientific evidence
visualizes instruments capable of amazingly precise measurement, of findings ar-
rived at by dispassionate scientific tests. In short, in the mind of the typical lay
juror, a scientific witness has a special aura of credibility.
SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 18, at 37.
116. See. e.g., Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence,
1970 U. ILL. L.F. I, 13. The author noted:
The fear has been expressed with reference to scientific devices or processes,
that where a mechanical device or chemical process plays a part in a line of
evidence, a degree of certainty may be suggested to the jury which may well be
absent in the case of expert testimony with its aura of human fallibility.
117. The manufacturer of the tachograph has devised a "speedometer accuracy
checker" to determine the number of revolutions per mile registered at the vehicle's speedome-
ter outlet. The instrument is attached to the drive cable and while the vehicle is driven over a
measured mile, the device counts the revolutions per mile. If 1000 revolutiens are recorded, the
speedometer is 100% accurate. If more or less revolutions are counted, the tachograph is sub-
ject to a proportionate degree of inaccuracy.
118. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts admitted mainte-
nance records and checklists pursuant to the business entry exception to the hearsay rule. See,
e.g., Webster v. State, 528 P.2d 1179 (Alaska 1974); People ex rel. Katz v. Jones, 10 Misc. 2d
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because testing of the device is not mandated by any authority, but
rather, is left solely to the discretion of the company installing it.
Thus, if the device has not been checked shortly before an accident
occurs, there is no guarantee that the tachograph was accurate at
the time of the accident. Improper maintenance, rough handling or
defective components could contribute to inaccuracy. Without the
technician's testimony or records, the instrument's working order is
virtually impossible to establish with any degree of certainty.
If such evidence is introduced and proper testing procedures
have been followed, the proponent will have established a rebuttable
presumption of accuracy. 19 Generally, a presumption has been de-
fined as "an inference required by rule of law to be drawn as to the
existence of one fact from the existence of some other established
basic fact or combination of facts."'12 0 In order for the presumption
to be supportable, the presumed fact must have an immediate con-
nection with or relation to the established fact from which it is
inferred.'
Applying these principles to the use of tachograph evidence, a
presumption of accuracy is warranted upon proof that the device was
tested and determined to be in good working order shortly before the
accident occurred. The presumption is based primarily on the
probability that if the tachograph was adequately maintained, then
it was recording accurately at the time of the collision.2 This infer-
ence must be drawn unless the opposing party produces sufficient
countervailing evidence of the non-existence of the presumed fact.'23
Thus, the presumption will have the effect of shifting the burden to
the opposing party to produce evidence that the tachograph was in-
accurate at the time of the recording. 24
1067, 171 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1958). In states that have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence
these records are admissible under 28 U.S.C.A. 803(6).
119. Among those jurisdictions where proof of accuracy is a necessary part of the propo-
nent's foundation, the courts have remained silent as to whether any presumption is created.
120. S. GARD, supra note 21, § 3:1, at 125.
121. Manning v. John Hancock Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 100 U.S. 693, 698 (1879).
122. Another example of a presumption grounded primarily in probability, arising in the
civil context, is the presumption that a letter properly addressed, stamped and mailed was duly
delivered to the addressee in the regular course of the mails. Rosenthal v. Walker, I ll U.S.
185 (1884).
123. RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 58, at 37 (J. Prince 10th ed. 1973). The effect of
presumptions in civil cases is an area wrought with considerable confusion. For a full discus-
sion of the numerous theories concerning the actual effect a presumption has on shifting the
burden of proof, see MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 345, at 819-29.
124. "The burden of producing evidence means the obligation of the party to present at
the appropriate time during the trial evidence on the issue involved of sufficient substance to
permit the fact-finder to act upon it." I D. LouISELLI & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
66, at 526 (1980).
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The primary method by which the opposing party may rebut
this presumption is through the introduction of testimony relating to
tampering, prior to the accident. Arguably, since the tachograph is
mounted in the cab of the truck, the operator's access to the instru-
ment is virtually unimpaired throughout the trip thereby making it
easy for the driver to alter the recordings in an effort to conceal
evidence of unauthorized activities from his employer. While this is
an important point, the presentation of evidence which demonstrates
that the device is subject to tampering is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of accuracy. Testimony concerning only the possibility
of error should not operate to deny the admissibility of the tacho-
graph charts. The general susceptibility of the instrument to tamper-
ing has no effect on the conclusiveness of the recorded speed.
Consequently, to overcome the presumption of accuracy, the op-
posing party must show that the device was actually tampered with
prior to the accident.125 Although this burden may be difficult to sus-
tain, the requirement is warranted given the low incidence of tam-
pering in applicable case law.1"6 Research has revealed only one civil
case in which evidence established that the device had been tam-
pered with before an accident. This recent case provides an excellent
example of the type of testimony capable of rebutting the presump-
tion of accuracy.
In Heine v. Adams,'2 7 the plaintiff's decedent was killed in a
multi-vehicle accident. The plaintiff sought damages from three dif-
ferent defendants, including the driver of a gasoline tanker and its
owner.1"8 At trial, the defendant's tachograph charts were admitted
into evidence.1 29 Following their introduction, an expert in the field
of tachograph analysis testified that the tachograph in the driver's
truck had been tampered with so that it would not register greater
than 55 miles per hour.130 The expert further testified that the tacho-
graph disc readout clearly showed that the driver had stopped his
125. Evidence of post-accident tampering may also be of some probative value to the
opposing party. See, e.g., Union Transports, Inc. v. Braun, 318 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958) (defendant's failure to produce tachograph recordings or to explain the failure to do so
strengthened the probative force of other evidence bearing upon the question of speed and was
of itself some probative force on the question).
126. Only four courts have been faced with an actual tampering, either pre-accident or
post-accident. See People v. Williams, 36 Cal. App. 3d 262, 111 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1974); Heine
v. Adams, 464 So.2d 836 (La. App. 1985); Barnum v. Williams, 84 Nev. 37, 436 P.2d 219
(1968); Union Transports, Inc. v. Braun, 318 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
127. 464 So.2d 836 (La. App. 1985).
128. Id. at 837.
129. Id. at 839. Although the chart was admitted into evidence, the court did not discuss
whether the proponent had laid a foundation prior to its introduction.
130. Id.
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truck and opened his locked tachograph, causing it to malfunction
for the rest of the evening.'
It was the expert's experienced opinion that tachographs are
usually unlocked and stopped in order to cover up the necessary
speeding a driver must do to make up for lost time caused by an
unscheduled stop.1' 2 Other evidence indicated that the driver had
been reprimanded by his employer on prior occasions for tampering,
and that he had falsified his daily logs to correspond with the events
related by the tachograph. 133
Undoubtedly, as the Heine case illustrates, the tachograph can
be tampered with to an extent that the recordings will be an inaccu-
rate reflection of the speed of the vehicle. Through the use of an
expert, evidence of tampering can be detected by analysis of the
driver's charts, and testimony can be offered to overcome the propo-
nent's presumption of accuracy. Under this approach, the opposing
party must refute the presumption through the introduction of evi-
dence that would support a finding of inaccuracy. 34 Evidence of ac-
tual tampering is sufficient to overcome the presumption that the de-
vice was operating accurately at the time the speed measurement
was made.3 5
Lastly, if the opposing party proffers evidence that justifies a
finding of inaccuracy, the judge would not mention the presumption
in his instructions to the jury.3 6 Alternatively, if the proponent has
been successful in laying a proper foundation, which his adversary
has failed to rebut, the presumption would be included in the judge's




134. This approach is consistent with the view set forth in the MODEL CODE OF Evi-
DENCE RULE 704(l), which provides: "[W]hen the basic fact of a presumption has been estab-
lished in an action, the existence of the presumed fact must be assumed unless and until evi-
dence has been introduced which would support a finding of non-existence or the basic fact of
an inconsistent presumption has been established."
135. "'Under this theory, the question of whether the evidence introduced to controvert
the presumed fact need only convince the judge to the point of concluding that the jury could
reasonably find in favor of the party against whom the presumption is directed on the issue
involved." I D. LOUISELLI & C. MUELLER, supra note 124, § 69, at 555.
136. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 704(2) provides:
[Wihen the basic fact of a presumption has been established in an action
and evidence has been introduced which would support a finding of the non-
existence of the presumed fact or the basic fact of an inconsistent presumption
has been established, the existence or non-existence of the presumed fact is to be
determined exactly as if no presumption had ever been applicable in the action.
137. If there is no evidence justifying a finding of inaccuracy of the tachograph, the
judge will instruct the jury that accuracy must be taken as a true fact.
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charts would be appropriately accepted as representative of the
speed at which the litigant's vehicle was traveling at the time of
impact.
IV. Conclusion
It is apparent that the courts have accepted the evidentiary use
of tachograph charts as an aid in establishing the speed at which a
vehicle was traveling prior to and at the time of impact. Most courts,
however, have failed to provide any specific criteria describing the
foundational prerequisites that must be met before the discs can be
introduced into evidence. As a result, the case law in this area is
confusing and reveals a lack of consensus among jurisdictions as to
whether the accuracy of the tachograph must be proven as a matter
of foundation, or whether it is merely a matter going to the weight of
the evidence.
Courts must recognize that accuracy is an essential element to
be proven by the proponent of tachograph evidence. The approach
outlined in this Comment is offered as a feasible alternative to the
vague standards enunciated in the past. This author suggests that
the courts should not permit the evidentiary use of the recordings in
the absence of a preliminary showing that the device was in good
working order prior to the time of the collision. Given the harmful
effects which can result from their introduction, the proponent
should not be allowed to cause substantial damage to his opponents
case by using evidence that may be totally lacking in credibility and
competency.
Karen Smith Cooney
